Inequality, mobility and the financial accumulation process: A
  computational economic analysis by Righi, Simone & Biondi, Yuri
ar
X
iv
:1
90
1.
03
95
1v
1 
 [e
co
n.G
N]
  1
3 J
an
 20
19
Inequality, mobility and the financial
accumulation process: A computational economic
analysis ∗
Yuri Biondi1 and Simone Righi2,3
1Cnrs - IRISSO (University Paris Dauphine PSL), Place Mar.
Lattre Tassigny 75016 Paris. yuri.biondi@gmail.com
2University College London, Department of Computer Science,
Gower Street 66-72, Office 3.10, WC1E 6EA London (UK).
s.righi@ucl.ac.uk
3MTA TK “Lendu¨let” Research Center for Educational and
Network Studies (RECENS), Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
January 27, 2019
Abstract
Our computational economic analysis investigates the relationship be-
tween inequality, mobility and the financial accumulation process. Ex-
tending the baseline model by Levy et al., we characterise the economic
process through stylised return structures generating alternative evolu-
tions of income and wealth through time. First, we explore the limited
heuristic contribution of one and two factors models comprising one single
stock (capital wealth) and one single flow factor (labour) as pure drivers
of income and wealth generation and allocation over time. Second, we
introduce heuristic modes of taxation in line with the baseline approach.
Our computational economic analysis corroborates that the financial ac-
cumulation process featuring compound returns plays a significant role
as source of inequality, while institutional arrangements including taxa-
tion play a significant role in framing and shaping the aggregate economic
process that evolves over socioeconomic space and time.
Keywords: inequality economic process compound interest simple in-
terest taxation computational economics
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1 Introduction and Literature Review
Capital wealth accumulation is an evergreen matter of economic analysis and
policy.1 Public finance and financial macroeconomic models define notions of
production, income and capital wealth and study their aggregated evolution
over time (Bertola et al 2006; Blanchard 2011; Snowdon and Vane 2005), as
well as their distribution across individuals (see the survey of economic literature
by Sahota 1978). In particular, some notable efforts aim to explain empirical
distributions as driven by either certain stochastic processes, or the combined
influence of driving factors such as family environment, talent, education and
social status. Recent economic modelling strategies include Nirei and Souma
(2007) and Gabaix et al (2016).
Since the fifties, the standard representation of growth denotes a multiplica-
tive process that is also the standard representation for individual financial
investments. This modeling strategy implicitly assumes a single capital stock
that is measured and reinvested for the aggregate economy over time (Perroux
1949; Stone 1986). Recent advances in dynamic macroeconomic modelling,
based upon the representative agent hypothesis, have been criticized for disre-
garding the aggregate dimension featured by collective and dynamic phenomena
Gallegati and Kirman 1999). Previously neglected, issues of income and wealth
distributions have gained socioeconomic momentum in the aftermath of the
Global Financial Crisis of 2007-08, including through the 99% movement in
US (Haldane et al 2014; Alvaredo et al 2013). This movement claims that the
increased financialisation of economy and society involves an increased appro-
priation of income and wealth by the richest 1% of the population at detriment
of the remaining 99%, leading to more unequal and allegedly unfair distribu-
tions of income and wealth. This distributional issue renewed theoretical inter-
est through influential positions taken by leading economists (Krugman 2013,
2014a,b; Stiglitz 2012; Solow 2014) and policy-makers (Haldane 2014)), as well
as through the publication of economic history studies conducted by Thomas
Piketty and Emmanuel Saez among others, reconstructing long-run statistical
time series of income and wealth distributions in US and abroad (Atkinson et al
2011, Piketty 2014,Piketty and Saez 2014).
According to Haldane et al (2014), “as ever, dispute rages about the precise
statistics. But the long-term patterns are clear enough - and remarkable. Al-
most half of the growth in US national income between 1975 and 2007 accrued
to the top 1% (OECD 2014). In the UK and US, the top 1%’s share of the
income pie has more than doubled since 1980 to around 15% and their share
of the wealth pie has been estimated at up to a third - more than the whole
1Hereafter, the term “capital wealth” combines concepts of capital and wealth to stress
the productive nature of wealth considered by our economic analysis. Indeed, we especially
point to financial investments, while durable assets held for consumption are excluded from
our analysis.
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bottom half of the population put together (ONS 2013; Wolff 2012). The five
richest households in the UK have greater wealth than the bottom fifth of the
population (Oxfam 2014)”.2
The theoretical issue of income and wealth distributions is well-known since
classic economic theorists in the XIX century at least, when the leading economist
J.S. Mill (1861) considered “fair and reasonable that the general policy of the
State should favour the diffusion rather than the concentration of wealth.” At
the beginning of the XX century, the leading economist and sociologist V. Pareto
argued for the so-called Pareto (power-law) wealth distribution as an empirical
regularity (Pareto 1895, 1965, 1897a,b), while the economic statistician C. Gini
developed ingenious statistical measurement techniques to capture this inequal-
ity through the so-called Gini index (Gini 1912). 3
Recent advances in econophysics point to the functional forms of statistical
distributions of income and wealth (Lux 2005). In particular, some scholars aim
to reproduce empirical regularities through simple, elegant additive economic
processes (Angle 2006; Richmond and Solomon 2001; Solomon and Richmond
2002). Other scholars purport to explain the fat tail of these distributions (that
is, the tail concerned with the higher ranges of aggregate income and wealth)
through multiplicative economic processes which lead to emerging power-laws
(Levy 2005; Levy and Levy 2003; Milakovic 2003). Some recent contributions
suggest the form of a deformed exponential function, which seems to capture
well the empirical regularities of income distribution at the low-middle range,
as well as its power-law tail (Kaniadakis 2001, 2002). These modelling attempts
have raised a lively debate with some economists who were worrying about
allegedly poor socioeconomic understanding and lack of theoretical economic
underpinnings (Gallegati et al 2006; Lux 2005). Further collaborative and in-
terdisciplinary research has developed the application of the k-deformed expo-
nential function to the parametric modelling of personal income and wealth dis-
tributions (Clementi and Gallegati 2015, 2017; Clementi et al 2007, 2008, 2009,
2010, 2012a,b, 2016). The latter approach provides insights on the drivers of
these distributions over time and across the population, while enabling syn-
thetic comparison through inequality and poverty measures that are derived
from parametric estimations.
In this context, generalising Champernowne (1953), Levy (2005) and Levy and Levy
2003 (Levy et al. thereafter) have developed an elegant modelling strategy pur-
porting to explain the power-law tail of income and wealth distributions under
financial market efficiency, and the stochastic distribution of financial returns
across individuals active in this market.
In sum, theoretical and societal attention paid to the economic inequality
issue raises the question of the cause of this inequality. Whichever tentative re-
sponse to this question has profound socioeconomic implications, raising further
2See also CBO (2011).
3Literature on the Pareto (power-law) distribution of wealth is too vast to be summarized
here and outside the purpose and scope of this article, which is not concerned with the
statistical form of wealth distribution. Further readings include: Kirman (1987); Dagum
(1990); Dra˘gulescu and Yakovenko (2001); Persky (1992)
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theoretical and applied concerns which go beyond the functional form of statis-
tical distributions of income and wealth across individuals. From this broader
perspective, our contribution purports to address two featuring dimensions:
(i) the inequality of income and wealth allocation across individuals, and
its evolution over time;
(ii) the significance of collective institutional mechanisms including taxa-
tion that actively frame and shape this economic process.
In particular, our modelling strategy consists in extending and improving on
existing literature by considering these two dimensions. Levy et al. provide a
convenient baseline model which subsumes the basic assumptions which charac-
terise widespread economic modelling on these matters. Fernholz and Fernholz
(2014) and Bertola et al (2006) review and develop more sophisticated models
that maintain similar background assumptions. In this context, Levy et al.
have the advantage to reduce the model structure to its minimal, synthetic, and
simple formulation. By elaborating on the Levy et al. model, our computa-
tional economic analysis will show the relevance of the financial accumulation
process that features compound return investment over time. This peculiar ac-
cumulation process explains qualitatively both the increasing inequality across
individuals, and the decreasing social mobility empirically observed in recent
decades.
The rest of the article is organised as follows. The second section introduces
a financial accumulation process model inspired by the Levy et al. model, as
baseline scenario. The third section shows the implications of this model for
the evolution of inequality and social mobility through time, assessing their
sensitivity to changes in variance and non-normal distribution of returns. The
fourth section extends the baseline model by introducing decreasing returns
and the simple return structure. The comparison with this latter structure
corroborates that, without financial accumulation, inequality is not increased
over time in the baseline scenario. The fifth section introduces a second flow
factor (labour income) along with the stock factor (capital wealth) considered
by Levy et al. The introduction of a flow factor may involve an income-saving
process that complements and integrates the financial accumulation process
driven by inherited wealth. All together, the analysis developed in the first
five sections makes clear that distributional effects, which depend on aggregate
configurations, have been neglected by the received literature. This preliminary
conclusion paves the way to introducing minimal institutions (a` la Shubik) that
denote collective mechanisms related to income and wealth distributions. In
particular, the sixth section introduces simple centralised modes of taxation,
featuring a proportional taxation model (proportional taxation of periodic net
income, uniformly redistributed through provision of universal public service),
and a progressive taxation model (progressive taxation of periodic net income,
redistributed in a regressive way through direct transfers). A summary of main
results concludes.
4
2 Modelling strategy for the financial accumu-
lation process
Levy et al. develop a simple model of aggregate economic process based upon
one stock factor (wealth) generating a pure compound rate of return ri,t stochas-
tically distributed across individuals and time periods. This model captures the
Pareto law shape in the high-wealth (and high-income) range of the aggregate
distributions, where “changes in wealth are mainly due to financial investment,
and are, therefore, typically multiplicative” (Levy 2005, p. 105). This mod-
elling strategy is based on a stochastic multiplicative process of wealth accu-
mulation with lower bound on wealth and homogeneous financial investment
talent. According to the authors, this framework implies that “the only reason
for inequality is the stochastic process - chance. This implies that there is no
differential ability in asset selection or in timing the [financial] market, which
is in line with the efficient-market hypothesis. [...] Homogeneous accumulation
talent means that all investors draw their returns randomly from the same dis-
tribution (the realized return, however, generally differs from one investor to
another)” (Levy and Levy 2003, p. 709 and 711).4 We formalise the Levy et al.
model of financial economic process through the familiar structure of compound
return. Thus, wealth Wt+1 of agent i at time t+ 1 is computed as:
Wi,t+1 = (1 + ri,t)Wi,t for r ≥ −1 (1)
or
Wi,T =Wi,1
T∏
t=1
(1 + ri,t) (2)
where each individual i draws his actual return ri,t at time t from the same
statistical distribution defined as follows: ri,t ∼ N(µr, σr) with µr, σr > 0.
We take σr sufficiently large to enable the possibility of financial investment
losses. Contrary to Levy et. al, our model does not include a reflective lower
bound on minimum wealth. This lower boundary would introduce an implicitly
redistributive process in the baseline scenario, while we prefer restricting this
scenario to pure financial accumulation. Moreover, Levy et al. require the
reflective lower bound in order to obtain the power-law distribution of wealth.
The statistical form of wealth distribution is outside the purpose and scope
of our article, which focuses instead on the relationship between the financial
accumulation process, inequality and social mobility.
In the degenerated case with r constant, the Eq. 2 becomes the classic
4In fact, Levy 2005 (chapter, p. 111, footnote 13) concedes that even joint accu-
mulation processes with heterogeneous accumulation talents are asymptotically Paretian,
with the faster-increasing multiplicative process dominating the high-range in the long run.
Fernholz and Fernholz (2014) maintain that, in their model, “luck alone - in the form of high
realised investment returns - [...] creates divergent levels of wealth.”
5
formula of compound returns over time:
WT =W1(1 + r)
T (3)
where for −1 ≤ r < 0 :Wt →t 0 and for r > 0 :Wt →t +∞.
This stylised model does not pretend to reproduce economic reality in its
totality. In particular, it does not introduce consumption, overlapping genera-
tions, or windfall gains and losses due to wars or accidents. However, it captures
one featuring element of the aggregate economic process: financial accumula-
tion opportunities. Compound returns feature financial investment dynamics
and related institutions. Financial institutions, such as investment funds, and
widespread measures of financial performance are based upon compound re-
turn as reference logic. It seems then particularly significant to disentangle and
analyse its impact. The aggregate economic process is increasingly managed
through corporate forms that live indefinitely and can then go on performing
financial accumulation. On the one hand, financial investment is conducted by
institutional investors which are driven by, and assessed against, compound re-
turn. On the other hand, eventual redistribution of their financial proceeds is
often received by corporate recipients that go on reinvesting those proceeds over
time, in a self-referential financial accumulation dynamics.
Throughout all our computational analysis, we assume an initial equal dis-
tribution of wealth Wi,t=1 = 10 ∀ i across all individuals at initial time t = 1.
This implies that inequality depends entirely on the specifications of the eco-
nomic process. Furthermore, for sake of simulation, we impose the same random
seed to all the various sets of simulations proposed in this article. When not
mentioned otherwise, we also define a population of N = 5000, and we run every
simulation round for tmax = 5000 steps.
5 Contrary to Levy et al., we allow the
theoretical possibility that individual wealth falls to, and remains at zero level.
Individual agents take financial investment risk and may occasionally lose all
their capital wealth. 6
Our computational economic analysis disentangles two featuring dimensions
to be analysed: wealth inequality across individuals, and social mobility relative
to wealth dimension.
Wealth inequality is captured through the Gini Index Gt which summarises
the relative concentration of wealth across individual at a certain period of time
t, defined as follows:
Gt =
[
(N + 1)− 2
(∑N
k=1(N + 1− k)wk,t∑N
k=1 wk,t
)]
1
N − 1
with 0 ≤ Gt ≤ 1 (4)
where N is the number of individuals and wk,t ≤ wk+1,t denotes the ranked
vector of Wi,t at time t. Accordingly, Gt → 0 when individual wealths become
5The Matlab code of the simulations can be found at:
https://github.com/simonerighi/BiondiRighi2018_JEIC
6For simulation purpose, we calibrate the parameter space to make this possibility unlikely.
In the scenarios presented in this article, despite the high number of iterations, no agent
ever loses its wealth completely. Agents experience partial losses (negative returns), but no
complete loss of their wealth.
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more equal, while Gt → 1 when richer individuals tend to acquire a larger
share of aggregate wealth. In order to further corroborate the results obtained
observing the Gini Index, we also study other measures of inequality such as
the Theil index; the absolute and relative share of income by the top 1% of
the population; and the evolution of the proportion of wealth appropriated by
different deciles of wealth. All these measures qualitatively confirm the results,
and are thus relegated to supplementary material.
Concerning wealth mobility, our Weighted Mobility Index Mt denotes the
relative change in wealth position by agent i between two adjacent time periods
t − 1 and t. We consider the average of this index across individuals at each
period t. Weighted Mobility Index Mt is computed as follows:
Mt =
1
N
N∑
i=1
[
|Dec [Wj ]i,t−1 −Dec [Wj ]i,t |
Dec [Wj=1]t −Dec [Wj=10]t
]
(5)
where Dec [Wj ]i,t represents the median wealth at time t for the decile j in
which agent i was at time t, while [Wj=1]t and [Wj=10]t denote respectively the
median wealth for the first and the last decile at time t. This index captures
the relative movement of the individual i whenever he moves across deciles,
relative to the maximum relative wealth distance between the first and the
last decile. By taking its mean for each period across the population N , we
denote the average wealth-weighted individual capacity to move across deciles
period after period. Again, in order to corroborate the results obtained with
this indicator, we test other measures of mobility. These additional measures
confirm the deductions that can be inferred from Mt and are thus relegated to
supplementary material.
3 The baseline case
The dynamics of wealth concentration across individuals over time is impressive
under the baseline scenario introduced by Levy et al. Wealth distributions
become increasingly skewed under various compound return structures where
individual returns are extracted from normal and gamma distributions at each
period of time. For all these structures, the upper tail of wealth distribution
goes on appropriating an increasing share of aggregate wealth over time. This
dynamic effect has implications for wealth inequality (Figure 1). In particular,
the Gini Index shows that wealth inequality is magnified under the baseline
case, asymptotically tending to its maximal value of one. In particular, drawing
upon Fernholz and Fernholz (2014)’ proof, we introduce the following Lemma 1
concerned with the evolution of time-average wealth distribution:
Lemma 1 The asymptotic value of a Gini Index based upon time-average wealth
tends almost surely to its maximum value of one.
Proof. See Appendix 7.1.
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Following Biondi and Olla (2018), we further introduce the following lemma
concerned with the Gini Index across the population at each point of time:
Lemma 2 The asymptotic value of the Gini Index Gt on the entire population
at a certain point of time t asymptotically tends almost surely to its maximum
value of one.
Proof. See Proof of Lemma 3.1 in Biondi and Olla (2018).
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Figure 1: Left Panel: Gini Index (Equation 4) over time periods for wealth
distribution of 5000 individuals under various return structures: ri,t ∼ N(µr, σr)
and gamma(a, b). The Gini Index asymptotically tends to one (see Appendix
7.1). Right Panel: Moving average over ten periods of Weighted Mobility Index
defined in Equation 5. The index is computed under various return structures
: ri,t ∼ N(µr, σr) and gamma(a, b). Averages and standard deviations are
computed out of 100 simulations. In all simulations initial wealth Wi,t=0 =
10 ∀i
Furthermore, as shown more systematically by Figure 2, the Gini Index is
increasing in the variance of the underlying return structure. This concentration
effect could be counterbalanced by social mobility relative to wealth, involving
the actual capacity of individuals to move across the wealth distribution through
time. However, our simulations show that this is not the case for the baseline
scenario. Indeed, the Wealth Mobility Index Mt shows that wealth mobility is
rapidly decreasing both over time (Figure 1, Right Panel) and in the variance
of returns (Figure 2, Right Panel).
Our result on wealth mobility is further reinforced observing the mobility
of the 1% richest individuals at different points of time. This experiment is
visualized in Figure 3. Having ranked all the agents according to their wealth
at one period t, the top 1% is selected. Ranks are normalized by dividing values
for the total number of agents so to establish a measure that is independent of
population size. In the Left Panel (Figure 3), we compute the average position
of each selected agent (that is, those included in the top 1% at period t) over
the following 1000 periods. We then show the distribution of probability of
8
Gini Coefficient at t
max
0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08
Standard Deviation of Individual Returns
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
0.08
Av
er
ag
e 
In
di
vid
ua
l R
et
ur
n
0.65
0.7
0.75
0.8
0.85
0.9
0.95
Weighted Movements Index (M t) at tmax
0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08
Standard Deviation of Individual Returns
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
0.08
Av
er
ag
e 
In
di
vid
ua
l R
et
ur
n
0.18
0.19
0.2
0.21
0.22
0.23
0.24
0.25
0.26
Figure 2: Left Panel: Gini Index Gt (Equation 4) value at time tmax = 5000
under baseline return structure ri,t ∼ N(µr, σr). Right Panel: Weighted Mo-
bility Index value at time tmax = 5000, as defined in Equation 5. The index
is computed under the baseline return structure : ri,t ∼ N(µr, σr). Both pan-
els: Values taken by µr are represented on the vertical axis, values taken by
σr are represented on the horizontal axis. In all simulations, initial wealth
Wi,t=0 = 10 ∀i.
this average rank position. 7 The farther is the time period t at which the
selection of the top 1% is made, the lower is the average rank position for those
top individuals. This implies a decreasing downward mobility and increasing
persistence of the top 1% over time. Moreover, Figure 3 (Right Panel) shows
the evolution of the average rank of individuals in the top 1% at time t over the
next 1000 periods. As time passes, richest individuals at a given period t tend to
remain among the richest. Indeed, while individuals that are among the richest
at t = 10, 100 may yet revert to some lower position over time (being replaced
by previously poorer individuals), individuals that are rich at t = 1000, 2000
tend to remain in the top decile of the wealth distribution. Finally, individuals
that are rich at t = 3000, 4000 tend to remain in the top centile of wealth over
time, thus perpetuating their social position relative to wealth.
Both results for wealth inequality and wealth mobility depend especially
on returns variance (Figure 2). Coeteris paribus, Gini Index is increasing and
Wealth Mobility Index is decreasing in return variance σr under normally dis-
tributed return structures (Figure 4, Left Panel). Interestingly, under our base-
line case, increased wealth inequality does not depend on mis-alignement be-
tween average individual financial returns and aggregate growth. As expected
(Figure 4, Right Panel), average aggregate growth remains in line with average
individual return in our baseline case.
This sensitivity to return variance in the baseline case is magnified by finan-
7The time average of rank positions reduces the impact of idiosyncratic oscillations. Similar
results are obtained by replacing the average rank positions with the individual positions after
1000 periods.
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Figure 3: This computational analysis captures the chance for agents that are
the richest at a certain point of time to remain among the richest throughout
further periods. Indicators compare their relative position in the wealth distri-
bution across periods of reference. Left Panel: Distribution of average normal-
ized ranking of agents belonging to the top 1% at certain periods of time. Right
Panel: Evolution of average normalized ranking of agents belonging to the top
1% at certain periods of time as function of time since that period. For both
panels N = 20000. The simulations are computed under the baseline return
structure with ri,t ∼ N(0.05, 0.05), while initial wealth Wi,t=0 = 10 ∀i.
cial market dynamics. Empirical evidence for financial markets behaviour shows
that actual market price and return series are not normally distributed, featur-
ing fat tails and extreme events (Mandelbrot 1963, 1967; Mantegna and Stanley
1996; Biondi and Righi 2016, 2017, providing further references). For sake of
simulation, we complement normal distribution of returns with a gamma dis-
tribution having the same mean as in the baseline case but featuring extreme
events, i.e., gamma(a, b) with a = 0.25 and b = 0.2 where a · b = µr = 0.05
and a · b2 = σr = 0.01. This parameterization for the gamma distribution is
applied to all our simulation analyses, when not stated otherwise. Computa-
tional results show that the gamma distribution of returns reinforces wealth
concentration and inequality, while undermining wealth mobility over time. In
particular, the Gini Index is always superior at each period of time (Figure 2,
Left Panel), while the Wealth Mobility Index is always inferior (Figure 2, Right
Panel). This result foreshadows that the non-normality of financial market re-
turns may have an inequality-enhancing impact, favouring skewed accumulation
of wealth across individuals and over time.
10
Average Aggregate Growth
0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08
Standard Deviation of Individual Returns
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
0.08
Av
er
ag
e 
In
di
vid
ua
l R
et
ur
n
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
Figure 4: Relationship between average aggregate growth and conditions of
individual returns. Aggregate Growth is defined by Equation 11 while mean
individual return is µr and the standard deviation of individual returns is σr.
By assumption, returns are dispersed according to the normal distribution ri,t ∼
N(µr, σr), in the baseline case, while initial wealth Wi,t=0 = 10 ∀i. Values
taken by µr ∈ [0.02; 0.08] (with incremental steps of 0.01) are represented on
the vertical axis, while values taken by σr ∈ [0.02; 0.08] (with incremental steps
of 0.01) are represented on the horizontal axis.
4 Decreasing compound returns and simple re-
turn structures: History matters
Levy et al. insist on the stochastic nature of their financial investment process.
Our computational economic analysis further points to its cumulative nature
over time, depending on the peculiar deployment of compound returns. Along
with stochastic extraction of the actual return r for investor i at each time t, the
financial investment process is further featured by the cumulative impact of the
individual series of compound returns on accumulated wealth through historical
time (Figure 1). A quick glance at the deterministic reduction of the process
model in Equation 2 shows that being richer at time t almost assures becoming
richer at a further time t+ n with n >> 0. Coeteris paribus, this evolutionary
structure tends to favour investors that become richer earlier in time, that is,
investors that accumulate net gains before (and net losses after) the others,
since every gain compounds positively, while every loss compounds negatively
through time. This cumulative process is exacerbated by the constant mean
return to wealth which was assumed in the baseline scenario. Therefore, rather
than ‘being lucky’, this process denotes that ‘history matters’. This financial
accumulation process has important implications for the evolution of wealth
through socioeconomic space and time. In a similar vein, Keynes (1933) would
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“trace the beginnings of British foreign investment to the treasure which Drake
stole from Spain in 1580”, reinvested at annual compound return of 3.25% over
the next centuries to 1930, while remembering its connection to “avarice and
usury and precaution that must be our gods for a little longer still [... to]
lead us out of the tunnel of economic necessity into daylight”. Hysteresis and
path dependency play an important role in explaining the inequality generated
by the financial accumulation process. Wealth concentration is ever-increasing
over time (Figure 1), while relative social mobility is undermined by increasing
differences in total wealth8, as showed by the Wealth Mobility Index (Figure
2). In sum, idiosyncratic compound returns on investment through time prove
to have cumulative effects, making the aggregate distribution of wealth not
stationary. In particular, this distribution becomes increasingly right-skewed
over time, tending to a limit in which wealth is concentrated entirely at the
top (see also Fernholz and Fernholz 2014; Biondi and Olla 2018). This right-
skewed tail of wealth distribution depends especially on the second order of
return distributions at a certain time period t (that is, the variance σr in case
of returns that are normally distributed).
This section further assesses the relationship between wealth inequality and
mobility and the evolution of returns through time. A first extension consists in
exploring alternative economic processes characterised by decreasing returns to
wealth. For simulation purposes, decreasing returns to aggregate wealth can be
introduced by imposing an external constraint on all the returns ri,t as follows:
(1 + ri,t) =
1 + ri,t
log(1 + TWt)
∀t > 1 (6)
where
TWt =
N∑
i=1
Wi,t (7)
Accordingly, all actual returns ri,t ∀i, t decrease in proportion to aggregate
wealth, which is positive and increasing on average over time by assumption.
Possible and actual net gains and losses are then progressively reduced over
time. Under our baseline assumptions, they tend to zero in the long run, that
is, 1 + ri,t → 1 for t → +∞. Decreasing returns are relevant here to test the
sensitivity of wealth inequality and mobility to time. In addition, positive con-
stant returns are not a reasonable hypothesis asymptotically, where constraints
on growth, as well as limits in natural and human resources, typically appear.
Decreasing returns may also denote the case of absent or decaying technological
development.
Computational results show that wealth inequality is materially reduced,
while wealth mobility is improved under decreasing returns. In particular, Gini
Index is consistently lower across time, while Weighted Mobility Index, although
8(Levy and Levy, 2003, p. 7) prove that “the actual wealth distribution converges to
a Pareto distribution [. . . ] with minimum wealth, average wealth, and variance that grow
over time” when a lower bound on minimum wealth is introduced. Without the latter, the
distribution converges to a non-stationary log-normal distribution.
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decreasing, remains asymptotically superior over time, relative to the baseline
case (Figure 5). Therefore, individuals are always less unequal and more able to
move across wealth relative levels in this scenario, relative to the baseline case.
Decreasing returns over time progressively reduce the opportunity by individuals
to gain or lose from their wealth investment and accumulation. Therefore,
individuals do not have sufficient occasions to accumulate wealth over time,
both in absolute and relative terms. Decreasing returns reshape both the first
and the second order of return distribution, reducing both the total wealth
and its dispersion across individuals over time. This result shows that wealth
inequality and mobility depend on temporal evolution of returns.
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Figure 5: Left Panel: Comparison of Gini Index over time under constant and
decreasing returns to aggregate wealth. Right Panel: Comparison of Weighted
Mobility IndexMt over time under constant and decreasing returns to aggregate
wealth. Averages and standard deviations are computed out of 100 simulations.
In both panels and configurations: the simulations are computed under the
baseline return structure with ri,t ∼ N(0.05, 0.05), and initial wealth Wi,t=0 =
10 ∀i. Under decreasing returns ri,t are modified according to Equation 6.
This preliminary conclusion is corroborated by analysing simple return struc-
ture, which further allows to investigate the distinctive impact of the cumulative
dimension of the baseline economic process. Simple return constitutes a refer-
ence logic which is diametrically opposite to compound return. It heuristically
corresponds to the ‘financial capital maintenance’ rule that is applied by cor-
porate accounting systems. This rule computes the maintenance of invested
shareholder equity from one period to the next one. The net difference is then
reported as net earnings that can be distributed to shareholders (if positive),
the undistributed part being accounted for as retained earnings. At the mi-
croeconomic level, simple return means that only net wealth is reinvested over
time, while eventual net gains are consumed period after period. This heuris-
tically corresponds to investing the same nominal amount in bonds and gilts
repeatedly, without reinvesting proceeds through time (Biondi 2011). At the
macroeconomic level, simple return may correspond to a capital formation pro-
13
cess that is stationary and constrained over reinvestment. Capital stock is then
reproduced rather than accumulated, its net contribution to total income being
consummated over time. Under simple return structure, financial capital is re-
munerated as productive factor but it is not financially accumulated over time.
It is then treated as a flow factor (becoming analogous to labor in this respect),
involving full consumption of all the net positive proceeds generated by capital
wealth at each period of time. Formally:
Wi,T =Wi,1(1 +
T∑
t=1
ri,t) with ri,t ≥ −1 ∀ i, t (8)
For sake of simulation, we compute actual simple returns under two return
structures: N(µr, σr) and gamma(a, b). Computational results (Figure 6) show
that wealth inequality does not accumulate under simple return structures, while
wealth mobility remains virtually constant over time. Individuals go on adding
their profits and losses to the initial invested capital, without reinvesting the
proceeds. Asymptotically, those profits and losses compensate each other be-
cause they are generated by an additive stochastic process applied over the same
initial amount. In particular, the Gini Index is decreasing and asymptotically
near to zero, while the Wealth Mobility Index remains asymptotically higher
than the baseline case. In Appendix 7.2, we analytically prove the following
Lemma (as visualised by simulations in Figure 6):
Lemma 3 The Gini Index Gt tends asymptotically to 0 for t → ∞, under
simple return structure, implying perfect equality among individuals.
Therefore, wealth inequality proves to be crucially dependent on the accu-
mulation of returns through time, while this accumulation further undermines
social mobility as expressed by relative levels of wealth. In sum, the economic
process modelled by Levy et al. denotes a significant connection between in-
equality and the financial accumulation process. This accumulation through
time proves to be conducive to increased wealth inequality and decreased wealth
mobility over historical time. However, its assumption of constant average re-
turns to aggregate wealth under compound return structure seems unsustain-
able, because indefinite compounding cannot realistically hold in the long-run
(Voinov and Farley 2007; Biondi 2011). Moreover, IMF studies (Berg and Osrty
2013; Ostry et al 2014) show that inequality affects growth, with higher inequal-
ity being associated with lower growth. It seems then unrealistic to assume a
structurally stable economic process while the upper wealth tail goes on appro-
priating an ever-increasing part of total wealth, with the Gini Index asymptot-
ically reaching the maximum value of one in the long-run. However, our model
clearly shows the logical and institutional tensions between the multiplicative
logic embedded in compound return, and this potential trade-off between in-
equality and growth. Let alone, such a multiplicative process may involve a
self-fulfilling decrease in returns, reducing then social welfare.
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Figure 6: Left Panel: Gini Index over time under simple return structure with
normal distribution N(µr, σr) = N(0.05; 0.05), and under simple return struc-
ture with Gamma distribution gamma(a, b) = gamma(0.25; 0.2). The Gini
Index asymptotically tends to zero (see Appendix 7.2). Right Panel: Moving
average of Weighted Mobility Index under simple return structure with nor-
mal distribution N(µr, σr) = N(0.05; 0.05), and simple return structure with
Gamma distribution gamma(a, b) = gamma(0.25; 0.2). Averages and standard
deviations are computed out of 100 simulations. In all cases, initial wealth
Wi,t=0 = 10∀i.
In order to extend this one-factor model, the next section shall introduce a
two-factors model of the economic process, adding a flow factor which features
an additive evolution to the stock factor characterised by a cumulative evolution
through time.
5 A model of aggregate economic process com-
bining capital wealth (stock) and labour (flow)
factors
According to Oulton (1976), policy attitudes towards the inequality of wealth
depend on views of its two paradigmatic causes. Accordingly, wealth inequality
can be explained either “because income was unequally distributed and hence
some people saved more, in consequence accumulating more wealth”, or because
wealth inheritance (accumulation) through time. Textbook macroeconomics
introduces a stylised economic process that combines both economic factors: one
stock factor (capital wealth) and another flow factor (labour). In this context,
the Cobb-Douglas is a classic function of production for the aggregate economy,
featuring factor returns to scale in its parameter space. Extending the baseline
model by Levy et al., a second flow factor can be introduced as follows. Total
income comprises the sum of wealth income and labour income as follows:
Y Ti,T = Y
W
i,T + Y
L
i,T (9)
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Labour income can be consumed (for a share 1− si,t) or saved (for a share
si,t) at every period t. Total wealth comprises then accumulated wealth at
compound returns and cumulated saved income as follows:
WSUMi,T =Wi,t=1
T∏
t=1
(1 + ri,t) +
∑
i,T
(si,t · Y
L
i,t) (10)
with ri,t ≥ −1 denoting pure wealth yield and 0 ≤ si,t < 1 denoting saving
share.
In this context, total wealth growth can be defined as follows:
Growtht =
TWt − TWt−1
TWt−1
(11)
where TWt applies Equation 7 to W
SUM
i,T defined in Equation 10. For sake
of generality and comparability, we introduce a fair condition between capital
wealth yields and the labour income savings by setting the initial capital wealth
so that it yields a weighted-mean permanent rent equal to the weighted-mean
saved income at each period of time t. For this purpose, the perpetual rent
value (to be equaled with the initial capital wealth) is computed by the ratio
between the period rent income and its period return rate.
According to our configuration, the wealth return ri,t defines the wealth
yield YWi,t = ri,tWi,t−1. The fair condition imposes that this wealth income is
equal, on average, to the saved income of the period. The latter is defined as
Y Li,t = si,tY
L
t .
Accordingly, the fair condition imposes that:
Wt=1 ≡
∑N
i=1(si,t · Y
L
i,t)∑N
i=1(ri,t)
(12)
Under this condition, our parameter space does not introduce any bias be-
tween the respective period incomes generated by the two factors on average
(Figure 7). At the onset, both factors contribute, on average, equally to total
income.
On this basis, we introduce labour income and savings with the same logic
which Levy et al. apply to capital wealth. We introduce a stochastic saving
rate si,t ∈ [0, 1] for which:
(i) all saving rates are equally likely, and
(ii) the average saving rate is always equal for all the individuals.
Under this assumption, taking Y Li,t = 1 and si,t ∼ U [0, 1] ∀i, t and recalling
that: 1
N
∑N
i=1(si,tY
L
i,t) = smean ≡ 0.5 while
1
N
∑N
i=1(ri,t) = µr ≡ 0.05, the fair
condition imposesWt=1 ≡
0.5
0.05 = 10 consistently with our assumption for initial
wealth Wi,t=1 = 10 for all individuals.
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Figure 7: Time evolution of the share of wealth generated by labour income and
labour-income savings. Averages and standard deviations are computed out of
100 simulations. See Section 5 for details about the simulation conditions.
Our computational analysis shows that the presence of a labor factor does
not reshape the baseline economic process concerning wealth inequality and
mobility. In particular, either if labour income cannot be saved (that is, si,t =
0 ∀i, t), or if savings cannot be reinvested (as in the previous Equation 10),
the additive process of labour factor cannot match the multiplicative process
of wealth accumulation. Consequently, the latter continues to dominate the
aggregate economic process in the long run. Wealth inequality and mobility are
not reshaped by the presence of that additive factor (Figure 8).
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Figure 8: Left Panel: Gini Index value over time under baseline case (one-factor
model), twofactors model without labor-income savings, and two-factors model
with reinvested savings over time. Right Panel: Moving average of Weighted
Mobility Index under baseline case (one-factor model), two-factors model with-
out labor income savings, and two-factors model with reinvested savings over
time. Averages and standard deviations are computed out of 100 simulations.
In all cases, initial wealth Wi,t=0 = 10∀i.
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Labour income alone cannot reshape wealth concentration, inequality and
mobility dynamics through time. Nevertheless, some may wonder whether rein-
vested savings from labour income could. To test this hypothesis we introduce
a progressive wealth accumulation driven by labour income savings. Formally:
Wi,t+1 =Wi,t(1 + ri,t) + (si,t+1Y
L
i,t+1) (13)
In this case, the saved share of labour income Y Li is progressively accumulated
through compound returns along with inherited wealth across individuals and
over time. Total individual wealth through time includes both saved wealth and
inherited wealth, formally:
WSUMi,t+1 =W1
t∏
h=1
(1 + ri,h) +
t+1∑
j=1
si,jY
L
i,j
t∏
k=j
(1 + ri,k) (14)
If labor income remains constant over time, i.e. Y Li,t = Y0 ∀i, t, this formula
reduces to:
WSUMi,t+1 =W1
t∏
h=1
(1 + ri,h) + Y0
t+1∑
j=1
si,j
t∏
k=j
(1 + ri,k) (15)
In Equation 15, we maintain that ri,h (returns over inherited wealth) have the
same structure as ri,k (returns over accumulated savings). For sake of simula-
tion, we continue to assume Y0 = 1 ∀i, t.
According to our computational results (Figure 8), even this progressive
reinvestment of savings cannot reshape wealth inequality and mobility under the
fair condition stated above. Wealth distributions and all the indexes maintain
the same behaviour as under the baseline case. 9
Although each individual draws savings from labour income according to a
uniform distribution, these savings are reinvested according to the same financial
accumulation process as the inherited wealth, which is initially equal for all
agents. Therefore, savings from labour income do not introduce an alternative
reference logic or a complementary economic process. Consequently, they cannot
reshape wealth distribution, inequality and mobility over time.
In sum, under both the Levy et al. model and the widespread two-factors
model of the aggregate economic process, wealth concentration, inequality and
mobility depend crucially on the compound return structure that characterises
the accumulation of financial investment over time. The decomposition of wealth
dynamics in two factors of productions does not change its evolution over time.
In fact, our computational results further show emerging aggregate be-
haviour that proves distant from economic reality, echoing the Knight 1938,
(p. 81)’s claim that:
The entire notion of ‘factor of production’ is an incubus on economic
analysis, and should be eliminated from economic discussion as summarily
as possible.
9The same results hold when actual returns are derived from simple return structure.
Computational results are available under request.
18
In a similar vein, (Solow, 1976, (p. 138)) acknowledged the aggregation problem
as follows:
I have to insist again that anyone who reads my 1955 article [Solow (1955)]
will see that I invoke the formal conditions for rigorous aggregation not
in the hope that they would be applicable [. . .] but rather to suggest
the hopelessness of any formal justification of an aggregate production
function in capital and labor.
Nevertheless, our computational analysis shed some light on theoretical and
applied implications that are implicitly assumed in widespread representations
and models of the aggregate economic process, as reviewed and further devel-
oped by Fernholz and Fernholz (2014) and Bertola et al (2006) among others.
From this perspective, the following section shall expand upon our preliminary
conclusions about inequality, mobility and the financial accumulation process.
We shall introduce a stylised institutional configuration that typically frames
and shapes income and wealth dynamics in economy and society: taxation.
6 The impact of taxation and redistribution
Taxation is a classic matter related to income and wealth distributions. Avail-
able statistics do extensively rely upon fiscal data for gathering evidence (Saez and Zucman
2014; Topritzhofer et al 1970). It is then interesting to explore its effect on
wealth concentration, inequality and mobility by expanding the baseline model
by Levy et al. through featured modes of taxation.
For simulation purpose, we introduce four stylised modes of taxation, all
governed by a central authority that knows and intervenes over the individual
positions of wealth and income (change in wealth) at the end of each period.
Four modes of taxation combine two methods of tax levy with two methods of
tax distribution:
• Concerning tax levy, we assume either a uniform proportional tax rate
for all individuals (uniform taxation), or a progressive tax rate increasing
with the tax base (progressive taxation).
• Concerning tax distribution, we assume either a uniform redistribution to
all individuals (featuring the provision of universal public service), or a
regressive redistribution that decreases with the tax base (featuring pro-
vision of direct transfers for welfare to the polity).
Under proportional taxation and public service model (Proportional & PS),
the tax authority levies a fixed universal share τi,t = τ ∀ i, t on positive net
changes in wealth Ti,t = max {Wi,t −Wi,t−1; 0}, and redistributes the total
levied amount equally among all the individuals. This model features the pro-
vision of public services to the polity through proportional taxation as follows:
Taxi,t = Ti,tτ ; (16)
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Subsidyi,t =
∑
k Taxk,t
N
(17)
Under proportional taxation and welfare model (Proportional & Wel-
fare), the tax authority employs the proportional tax levy to provide direct
transfers to the polity. These transfers are redistributed in regressive propor-
tion to individual wealth. Individual tax is computed according to Equation 16,
while the redistribution is managed according to the following formula:
Subsidyi,t =
[
1−
Ti,t∑N
k=1 Tk,t
]
1
N − 1
∑
k
Taxk,t (18)
Under progressive taxation and public service model (Progressive & PS),
the tax authority levies a progressive share Ti,t of net changes in wealth. Accord-
ingly, the richest individual applies the maximum rate τmax = τi,t(max T ) ∀t,
while the poorest individual does not pay anything. On this basis, the tax au-
thority provides a universal public service to all the individuals. Individual tax
payment is defined as follows:
Taxi,t = Ti,t · τmax
Ti,t −min Ti,t
maxTi,t −min Ti,t
(19)
On this basis, the individual i having the maximal tax base Ti,t applies the
maximal tax rate τmax, while the individual i having the minimal tax base Ti,t
does not pay taxes (i.e., its tax rate τi,t = 0 at time period t). The redistribution
mechanism under this model follows Equation 17.
Finally, under progressive taxation and welfare model (Progressive & Wel-
fare), the tax authority employs the tax levy denoted by Equation 19 in order
to redistribute the total levied amount in a regressive proportion to wealth, ac-
cording to Equation 18. This model features the provision of direct transfers to
the polity, funded by progressive tax levy.
In sum, our computation analysis features four stylised modes of taxation,
summarized in Table 1.
Table 1: Stylised modes of taxation and redistribution
Tax redistribution Proportional Regressive
Tax Levy Redistribution Rate Redistribution Rate
Proportional Tax rate Proportional taxation & public service Proportional taxation & welfare
Progressive Tax Rate Progressive taxation & public service Progressive taxation & welfare
We assess the impact of taxation over wealth inequality and mobility un-
der these stylised modes of taxation. For sake of simulation, we retain a tax
rate τ = 0.05 for the proportional tax system and a maximum tax rate of
τmax = 0.10 for the progressive taxation. Under progressive tax regimes, this
framework implies a tax-rates structure that endogenously depends on the dis-
tributions of income (net wealth change) and wealth and their evolution over
time. Computational results (Figure 9, 10) show that all modes of taxation and
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redistribution are effective in reducing and stabilising wealth inequality (Fig-
ure 9, Left Panel), while improving and stabilising wealth mobility (Figure 9,
Right Panel). Contrary to savings from labour income, taxation effectively in-
troduces an alternative economic logic and a complementary economic process
in our miniature economy. This alternative and complementary collective action
proves to be effective in compensating the impact of financial accumulation over
wealth inequality and mobility.
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Figure 9: Left Panel: Gini Index over time under baseline case (no taxation),
proportional taxation and public service model (Proportional & PS), pro-
portional taxation and welfare model (Proportional & Welfare), progressive
taxation and public service model (Progressive & PS) and progressive taxa-
tion and welfare model (Progressive & Welfare). Right Panel: Weighted Mo-
bility Index over time under the same cases. Averages and standard deviations
are computed out of 100 simulations. In all cases, initial wealthWi,t=0 = 10 ∀i.
See Section 6 for details about implementation of taxation and redistribution
systems.
In particular, Gini Index is consistently and materially inferior to the baseline
case, while it remains asymptotically far from one. Wealth mobility indicators
are consistently and materially superior to the baseline case featured by the
Levy et al. model.
The actual relative impact on wealth inequality and mobility across modes of
taxation depends on the parameter space assumptions. Computational results
(Figure 10) for mean tax and redistribution rates explain why progressive tax-
ation is less effective than proportional taxation in reshaping wealth inequality
and mobility, under our framework of analysis. As mentioned above, individual
tax rates under progressive tax regimes depend on the underlying distribution
of wealth. Since the latter is increasingly right-skewed over time, this depen-
dency involves a mean tax rate that progressively becomes and remains very
low over time (materially inferior to the mean tax rate of 0.05 applied under
proportional tax regimes). Consequently, the impact of progressive tax regimes
over wealth inequality is materially reduced both in absolute terms, and relative
21
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Figure 10: Left Panel: Mean Tax Rate over time under baseline case (no taxa-
tion), proportional taxation and public service model (Proportional & PS),
proportional taxation and welfare model (Proportional & Welfare), progres-
sive taxation and public service model (Progressive & PS) and progressive
taxation and welfare model (Progressive & Welfare). Right Panel: Mean Re-
distribution rate over time under the same cases. Bottom Panel: Ratio between
the total tax levied on the richest 50% of the population, relative to the total
wealth of the bottom 50% of the population. Averages and standard deviations
are computed out of 100 simulations. In all cases, initial wealthWi,t=0 = 10 ∀i.
See Section 6 for details about implementation of taxation and redistribution
systems.
to proportional tax regimes which apply an exogenous fixed tax rate. Moreover,
since wealth distribution is increasingly and materially right-skewed over time,
a relatively low tax rate is sufficient to asymptotically stabilise the Gini Index
(Figure 9, Left Panel). Wealth is so concentrated on the top (see Lemma 1)
that a relatively low tax extraction from the richer is sufficient to materially
increase wealth of the poorer, involving a stabilising effect of wealth inequality
over time (Figure 10, Bottom Panel). This result does not establish preference
for, or superiority of proportional tax regimes over progressive tax regimes. In-
deed, the effectiveness of the proportional tax system, while guaranteeing higher
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tax collection, neglects the regressive nature of this tax mechanism. A policy
implication of this result is that effectiveness of fiscal systems depends on the
underlying economic structure and process. Therefore, our analysis would rec-
ommend tax authorities committed to progressive tax regimes to maintain tax
rate structures based on absolute wealth thresholds and independent from rel-
ative wealth levels. The latter tax authorities should secure a sufficient degree
of progressiveness of taxation, as well as a sufficiently high top tax rates.
In conclusion, taxation materially reduces wealth concentration and inequal-
ity, compensating the impact of financial accumulation process. Taxation proves
therefore to be effective in counterbalancing the inequality effects of the finan-
cial accumulation process. This result is consistent with Fernholz and Fernholz
(2014) arguing that “the presence of redistributive mechanisms then ensures the
stability of the distribution of wealth over time”.
7 Concluding remarks
The poet Trilussa mocked national statistics to be that accounting method for
which, one individual having eaten two chickens and another one just none, both
would result to have eaten one chicken each.10 Students of income and wealth
distributions may keep this adage in mind while developing related macroeco-
nomic modelling, especially under the representative agent assumption.
Our computational economic analysis shows the significant connection be-
tween inequality and the financial accumulation process in the study of income
and wealth distributions. This connection has been investigated through pro-
gressive extensions of the baseline model introduced by Levy et al. Our analysis
shows the limited heuristic contribution of a two factors model comprising one
single stock (capital wealth) and one single flow factor (labour) as pure drivers
of aggregate income and wealth generation and allocation over time. We fur-
ther show the theoretical contribution of minimal institutions (a` la Shubik), to
partly overcome this limitation. In particular, we investigate heuristic models
of taxation in line with the baseline approach. Drawing upon our computa-
tional economic analysis, we can infer that the financial accumulation process
plays a significant role as socioeconomic source of inequality, while institutional
configurations including taxation play another significant role in framing and
shaping the aggregate economic process that evolves over socioeconomic space
and time. Our computational economic analysis is based upon a simple mod-
elling strategy combined with a calibration that is suitable for comparing alter-
native model configurations. This calibration does not necessarily fit empirical
regularities. Therefore, we cannot infer empirical or forecasting predictions,
but rather theory-driven implications that deserve further consideration from
theoretical and applied viewpoints. Wealth inequality and mobility are impor-
tant socio-economic dimensions of our economy and society. Increased wealth
10“Me spiego: da li conti che se fanno \ seconno le statistiche d’adesso \ risurta che te tocca
un pollo all’anno: \ e, se nun entra nelle spese tue, \ t’entra ne la statistica lo stesso \ perche`
c’e` un antro che ne magna due.” (Trilussa, La statistica)
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inequality may raise fairness issues, undermining economic sustainability and
development through historical time. Decreased wealth mobility may raise fur-
ther fairness issues, undermining socio-economic incentives to entrepreneurship
and workmanship. Concerning wealth inequality and mobility issues, our com-
putational economic analysis points to featuring drivers that deserve further
attention by researchers and policy-makers. First of all, the financial accumu-
lation process appears to be the key driver of both issues, generated by the
peculiar compound return structure that characterises financial investment in
widespread institutional configurations. Its contribution to wealth inequality
and mobility further appears to fundamentally depend on the financial market
dynamics featuring volatility clustering and extreme events. Labour income
and savings do not appear to be able to rebalance the impact of this financial
accumulation process through historical time. Contrastingly, taxation appears
to be effective in compensating its effect. Finally, according to our computa-
tional economic analysis, the causes of recent increases in wealth inequality may
be sought in socioeconomic transformations of financial market dynamics and
taxation (including fiscal niches exploitation, tax avoidance and the flattening
of tax progressiveness) over recent decades. From our theoretical perspective,
return structure, volatility and exuberance in financial markets, as well as the
working of fiscal systems are candidates to drive wealth inequality and wealth
mobility in our economy and society.
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Appendix
7.1 Proof of Lemma 1 - Gini evolution for Compound In-
terest Structure
Proof. We aim at proving that, for compound interest structure, Gt → 1 as
t→ +∞.
Our proof draws upon Fernholz and Fernholz (2014). Our model for com-
pound return structure replicates the background structure of the Fernholz and Fernholz
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(2014) model, as represented by their Equation 10. Accordingly, with our nota-
tion:
Wi,t =Wi,t=1 · e
r(t) (20)
This equation denotes continuously compound return structure over time, with
return function r(t) depending on a standard Brownian motion. In this context,
Fernholz and Fernholz (2014)’s Theorem 2 proves that, if σr > 0, the time-
averaged share of total wealth held by the wealthiest single household converges
to one, almost surely (their Equation 13), although it is not the same household
to maintain the leading position over time. Analytically:
lim
t→+∞
∫ t
0
θi,t(t)dt = 1 a.s.
with θi,t =
Wi,t∑
t
Wi,t
and where θmax,t = maxi[θi,t].
Our model applies a discretely compound return structure as follows:
Wi,t =Wi,t=1
∏
(1 + ri,t)
Without loss of generality, this structure can be made continuous by making
the time change infinitesimal as follows:
Wi,t →Wi,t−1 · e
R(t) with dt→ 0 (21)
R(t) = ln(1 + ri,t) (22)
Where the R(t) function transforms our return ri,t from discrete to continuous
time. This formulation is analogous to Fernholz and Fernholz (2014) formula,
since ri,t ∼ N(µr;σr) by construction. Their proof applies then to it.
7.2 Proof of Lemma 3 – Gini evolution for Simple Interest
Structure
Proof. We aim at showing that, for simple interest structure, Gt → 0 as
t→ +∞.
The Gini Index tend to 0 if the wealth of all individuals tends to be equal
for t→ +∞. By construction, ∀t
Wi,t =Wi,1(1 +
∑
t
ri,t)
The equality condition imposes that Wi,t =Wj,t, thus:
Wi,1(1 +
∑
t
ri,t) =Wj,1(1 +
∑
t
rj,t)
or
Wi,1(1 +
∑
t
ri,t)−Wj,1(1 +
∑
t
rj,t) = 0 (23)
25
Given that Wi,1 =Wj,1 =W1, for each i, j by assumption (i.e., equal initial
wealth for all agents), Equation 23 becomes:
W1 +W1
∑
t
ri,t −W1 −W1
∑
t
rj,t = 0 (24)
or simplifying:
W1[
∑
t
(ri,t)−
∑
t
(rj,t)] = 0
since r ∼ N(µr, σr) by construction and since
∑
rh,t → t · µr if t→ +∞ ∀h =
i, j, then:
W1
[∑
t
(ri,t)−
∑
t
(rj,t)
]
→ 0 for t→ +∞
Q.D.E.
Remark 4 The same result can be relaxed and hold if r has a distribution stably
converging to its mean µr for t→ +∞
Remark 5 If we introduce heterogeneous initial distribution of wealth (that is,
Wi,1 6= Wj,1 for some i, j), it can be proved that the simple return dynamics
tends to be neutral on the initial ranking for t → +∞, that is, the initial rank-
ing is maintained in the long-run under the simple return structure (see also
Biondi and Olla 2018).
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